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1.  Introduction 
As a financial cooperative, Farm Credit System (FCS) lending association is established 
and organized to provide available and reliable agricultural loans to farmers. As a cooperative 
enterprise, FCS association is constituted to share the profit with members and the primary 
means is the patronage refunds. In 2008 FCS declared $958 million patronage refunds 
distribution which equals 33% of its net income.
1  
For FCS lending associations, paying out patronage refunds helps entice members to do 
business with the cooperative, reduces members’ borrowing cost, and also benefits the 
cooperative with tax exemptions
2. On the other hand, paying out patronage refunds, especially in 
cash, lowers the capital sources which support the financial safety and growth of the cooperative. 
Retained patronage refunds are the major source of equity capital for financial cooperatives. 
Since FCS associations face such tradeoffs between maintaining sufficient capital reserves and 
providing reasonable returns to members, understanding how the cooperatives approach this 
problem is an interesting question from both a regulation and efficiency perspective. 
Paying patronage refunds is a unique feature of the capital management in financial 
cooperatives. It is comparable to the dividends payments in the corporations in the sense of 
sharing profit with the shareholders. Dividends are paid based on the number of shares, i.e., the 
amount of capital stock. Patronage refunds are paid based on the contribution to the net interest 
income of the association that was made by the shareholder, i.e., the amount of loan volume. 
There is considerable amount of research on the dividends policy in finance journals in the past 
ten years (Fama and French 2001, Grullon et al. 2002, Dickens et al. 2002, Julio and Ikenberry 
                                                            
1 2008 Farm Credit Administration Annual Report  
2 If the cash proportion of patronage refunds is at least 20%, the proportion is exempted from income tax. Page 2 of 27 
 
2004, DeAngelo et al. 2006, Haggard and Howe 2008, maybe more), but the patronage refunds 
of financial cooperatives, especially FCS, have not been addressed directly. Except one paper 
(Briggeman and Jorgensen 2009) used survey data of one FCS association and found that the 
members strongly prefer patronage refunds over lower fixed interest rates, much of the literature 
on patronage refunds have focused on the production cooperatives who cooperate in marketing, 
or supplies and equipment purchasing (Beierlein and Schrader 1978, Knoeber and Baumer 1983, 
Royer 1987, 1993, Royer et. al. 1997, 2007). Reasons include the lack of consistent and clean 
dataset, and the difficulty of incorporating the regulated capital management of financial 
cooperatives.  
The general theory of cooperatives and the outcomes of the empirical studies on 
production cooperatives are worthwhile in analyzing the financial cooperatives. Yet FCS as a 
system of cooperatives has its uniqueness, such as:  FCS association serves as the financial 
intermediation in the farm debt market. FCS is government sponsored enterprise (GSE). FCS’s 
operation and capital management are quite regulated for safety consideration. As for deciding if 
and how much patronage refunds to pay, there are multiple determinants, for example, the capital 
position, the financial performance, the preference of the members, and the operational 
philosophy of the association’s manager. It is commonly recognized that the FCS association is 
reluctant to reverse the patronage refunds paying decision. This implies that associations that 
currently pay patronage refunds are more likely to continue paying while the associations that 
currently do not pay patronage refunds prefer continue not paying.  Therefore it is important to 
distinguish the associations and focus on the decision of paying or not paying patronage refunds 
at first before further analyzing the decision of how much patronage refunds shall be paid.    Page 3 of 27 
 
This paper analyzes the evolution of paying patronage refunds of all FCS lending 
associations in the U.S. from 2000 to 2009. The time series pattern and regional pattern of 
paying patronage refunds are examined. The characteristics of the associations who pay 
patronage refunds are compared with those associations who do not pay.  A logistic regression 
model is developed to identify the important factors that influence the decision of paying 
patronage refunds. 
This paper makes three contributions to the empirical studies on financial cooperatives. 
First, the paper utilizes a large panel dataset which includes all the FCS associations nationwide 
and over a 10 year horizon. Therefore it is feasible to statistically identify, empirically test, and 
generally draw conclusion of the systematic patterns in the patronage refunds paying behavior. 
Second, to my knowledge this is the first piece of work that investigates the determinants of 
patronage refunds paying decision in the agriculture financial cooperatives, especially FCS 
associations. Third and perhaps most importantly, the FCS is currently undergoing a risk-
adjusted capital structure reform, therefore the research discussing on patronage refunds decision 
and capital management efficiency issues can contribute to better reform policies. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the concept and the forms of 
patronage refunds of FCS associations. Section 3 reviews the relevant studies on the patronage 
refunds of cooperatives. Section 4 examines the time trend and regional pattern of the 
associations who pay patronage refunds. Section 5 explains the dataset and model specification. 
The characteristics of those who choose to make patronage refunds are summarized and 
compared to those who do not. Section 6 documents the preliminary findings and section 7 
provides main conclusions based on the preliminary findings.  Page 4 of 27 
 
2.  Understanding the Patronage Refunds 
In FCS associations, the patrons are also the members, the owners, the shareholders, and 
the borrowers. A farmer needs to choose either paying $1,000 or 2% of the loan amount, 
whichever is less, to become a member and then borrows from the FCS association. For 
example, Farmer A needs to borrow $80,000 loan, decides to purchase $1,000 share of capital 
stock, and becomes a member of an FCS association. Farmer B borrows $60,000, purchases 
$1,000 share of capital, and also becomes a member. In the end of the year if that association 
declares patronage refunds, Farmer A receives more patronage refunds than Farmer B even both 
of them purchase the same amount of capital stock, i.e. $1,000. The patronage refunds are 
calculated on the base of $80,000 and $60,000 respectively. Therefore FCS’s patronage refund is 
distributed proportional to the member’s loan volume rather than member’s capital contribution.  
Patronage refunds can be paid in cash, in allocated equity, in capital stock or in any 
combination of these three in FCS associations. Cash format is self-explanatory and the primary 
refunding method. Allocated equity is the portion of the patronage refunds which is designated 
under each member’s equity account and is deducted from the gross taxable income of the 
association. It has been “allocated to” and “belongs to” the members but not “distributed” yet. In 
fact the members have to pay income tax for this proportion even they haven’t received that 
amount at current year. Besides cash and allocated equity, patronage refunds can also be returned 
in the format of capital stock. But none of the FCS associations in my dataset (2000-2009) chose 
this format. In practice, the patronage refunding procedure often works with a revolving method.  
The revolving account has a term structure which pays certain amount back to each member at 
each period over a certain time horizon and follows a first-in and first-out order.  Page 5 of 27 
 
Table1. Patronage refunds distribution in the FCS accounting-book. 










in Cash  -$60      -$60 
in Allocated Equity  -$30  +$30    $0 
in Capital Stock  -$10    +$10  $0 
Earnings 
Retired 
from Allocated Equity    -$35    -$35 
from Capital Stock      -$5  -$5 
Net   -$100  -$5 +$5  -$100 
Note: If patronage refund is paid in cash, both Unallocated Surplus and Equity are reduced. If patronage 
refund is paid in Allocated Equity, Allocated Equity is added, Unallocated Surplus is reduced, and Equity 
does not change. If patronage is paid in stock, Capital Stock is added, Unallocated Surplus is reduced, and 
Equity does not change. 
 
Table1 shows that how the FCS accounting-book records the patronage refunds 
distribution in different formats. For example, $100 of net income, i.e. Unallocated Surplus, is 
declared as patronage refunds. $60 is paid in Cash, $30 in Allocated Equity and $10 in Capital 
Stock. The cash patronage refunds reduced Equity by $60 immediately. $30 paid in Allocated 
Equity is transferred from the Unallocated Surplus account to the Allocated Equity account and 
current Equity is not affected. $10 paid in Capital Stock is transferred from Unallocated Surplus 
account to Capital Stock account and current Equity is not affected either.  
The Allocated Equity account and Capital Stock account are revolving accounts which 
are set up for retaining earnings, distributing patronage refunds, and retiring memberships. In 
Table1, $35 is retired from the Allocated Equity and $5 is retired from the Capital Stock. The 
revolving account performs like a tank, with $30 flowing in and $35 flowing out in Allocated 
Equity, $10 flowing in and $5 flowing out in Capital Stock. Of course it can be more total flow-
in than total flow-out or vice versa.  Page 6 of 27 
 
Therefore in this scenario $100 of the current earned net income has been distributed but 
$95 is actually paid out as patronage refunds in current period. $60 is from current earnings and 
$35 is from the revolving account of Allocated Equity. $5 from the Capital Stock reduces the 
Equity level but is considered as patronage refunds since normally the Capital Stock retirement 
only happens at the end of the member’s borrowing relationship with the associations. In the 
example of Farmer A and B, they pay $1,000 to purchase the associations’ stock and become the 
members. The $1,000 will be returned to them when their borrowing relationship with the 
associations ends.  
There are 63 out of 86 FCS associations paid patronage refunds in 2009 while only 74 out 
of 183 associations paid in 2000. This overall increasing trend is different from the industrial 
firms’ “disappearing dividends” phenomenon (Fama and French 2001) and the “decline of 
dividend payers” in commercial banks (Haggard and Howe 2008). For FCS associations, paying 
out patronage refunds is a marketing tool to attract borrowers and also benefits the cooperative 
with tax exemptions. For the borrowers, receiving patronage refunds reduces patrons’ total 
borrowing cost. It also gives patrons the cash to pay their income tax related to the member’s 
earnings allocated. In fact the latter reason is a good reason for some associations to choose to 
have patronage refunds program.  
Even though paying patronage refunds can be a non-economic decision, systematically 
analyzing the trend, pattern and possible determinants is still the important step to further 
understand the patronage refunds program and how it contributes to the efficient capital 
management in FCS associations. After all it is observed that more and more associations start to 
pay patronage refunds and start to pay more patronage refunds.  Page 7 of 27 
 
3.  Relevant Studies 
There are several articles targeting on the issue of patronage refunds in producing 
cooperatives who cooperate in the areas of buying supplies and equipment and of marketing 
(Tubbs 1971, Dahl and Dobson 1976, Beierlein and Schrader 1978, Knoeber and Baumer 1983, 
VanSickle and Ladd 1983, Junge and Ginder 1986, Caves and Petersen 1986, Royer 1987, 1993, 
Royer and Shihipar 1997, and Royer and Smith 2007). But patronage refunds payment of 
financial cooperatives has rarely been addressed in prior studies. Only Briggeman and Jorgensen 
(2009) used survey data of one FCS association in Oklahoma and concluded that members 
strongly prefer patronage refunds compared to lower fixed real estate interest rates. 
The patronage refunds and patron valuation studies appeared in the literatures since 
1970s when the financial cost of equity capital in cooperatives started to be a popular topic in 
agricultural economics journals. Tubbs (1971) studied the impact of coop patronage refunds on 
the farm operations. He argued that low cash patronage refunds amount and long revolving fund 
terms may hurt the farmers in the sense of discounted present value because of the immediate tax 
obligation Royer 2004.  
Dahl and Dobson (1976) chose three Wisconsin coops with 189 members as their data 
sample. They assumed fixed returns and repayment period on loans, fixed rates for stock and 
debt, fixed tax rate, fixed rate of annual increase on stocks and debt. Therefore the cost of each 
capital source could be calculated recursively for a 7 year time horizon under 9 combinations of 
different cash patronage refunded ratio and 5/10 years revolving periods. The smallest cost 
scenario was picked as the optimal capital structure. The unique feature of their paper is giving 
an opportunity cost for the revolving funds which equals the cost of short debt of farmers. Their Page 8 of 27 
 
findings related to patronage refunds are that changing patronage cash amount has more 
significant impact on financial cost than shortening revolving fund term. Compared to 20%, 
60%, 80% and 100% patronage refunded in cash scenario, 40% represents the optimal financial 
mix.  
Beierlein and Schrader  (1978) did similar research as Dahl and Dobson . They defined a 
base case capital structure of a representative farmer cooperative with 50% debt and 50% equity. 
They assumed fixed parameters such as tax rate, interest rate, debt repayment ratio, capital stock 
retirement ratio, patronage refunds growth rate, and etc. A deterministic simulator was used to 
generate the changes of the capital structure and the after tax present value of patron benefits 
over 20 years. Six capital configurations such as capitalization with only stock, capitalization 
with only debt, capitalization with 50% debt and 50% stock, etc. were evaluated with different 
annual patronage growth rates. Their illustration showed the complexity of the relationships 
among the capital structure of a cooperative and the generalization of particular capital plans was 
difficult because of the interaction with patron cash flows. Their findings on patronage refunds 
policy are: the total value of patron benefits decreases as the cash percentage of patronage 
refunds increases; shortening the revolving fund cycle has only negligible effect on patron 
benefits.   
VanSickle and Ladd (1983) mathematically derived a model for the analyzing the 
economics of a cooperative’s financial structure. The objective assumed by the coop is to 
maximize the total after-tax profits of the patrons.  The total profits function is composed with 
the patron’s net total revenues, received dividends on capital stocks, received cash patronage 
refunds, and discounted revolving patronage refunds. The constraint conditions include the cash Page 9 of 27 
 
patronage refunds proportion (20%-100%), dividend rate on capital stock (<8%). Other 
constraints are formed with the components of capital and net savings. The decision variables are 
the cash patronage refund ratio, revolving term length, dividend rate, qualified patronage refunds 
and debt. In order to get feasible and reasonable solutions, predetermined parameters were 
defined and a numerical searching algorithm was applied. They concluded that paying 70% of its 
patronage refunds in cash benefits the members more than paying 100% or 20% in cash. They 
showed that shortening the deferral period for patronage refunds leads to the coop using more 
debt and paying less patronage refunds in cash. 
Knoeber and Baumer (1983) developed a model of the cooperative members in order to 
understand the retained patronage refunds in agricultural cooperative. They assumed no tax, no 
dividends, and an absolute risk-averse utility function for farmers. Each farmer had only two 
assets, which are the assets used in farming operation and the retained patronage refunds in the 
coop. Each farmer maximized the expected utility function for the optimal share of retained 
patronage refunds. The median level of all the farmers’ preferred shares would be selected by the 
cooperative with a majority rule process.  
The 1980’s agricultural depression created tough time for agricultural cooperatives and 
FCS institutions. FCS institutions went through government assistance and organizational 
restructure. Related agricultural finance literatures focused on the loan portfolio deterioration and 
assets growth. Caves and Petersen (1986) showed that increasing the retention ratio of earnings 
accelerate coop’s growth only in the short run. Junge and Ginder  (1986) showed that 20% cash 
patronage refunds may generate negative cash flow to patrons who belongs to low tax brackets. 
Cooperatives have to increase the cash patronage refunds, shorten revolving periods, or use Page 10 of 27 
 
nonqualified allocation of surplus which won’t be considered as taxable. Fulton et al. (1995) also   
concluded that need for cooperatives to redeem the equity accumulated leads to a reduction in 
the growth rate. This implies that distributing patronage refunds will slow the cooperatives 
growth.  
Royer and Shihipar (1997) analyzed how the cash proportion of patronage refunds affects 
the cash flow of individual patrons and how the patron’s preferences between cash amount and 
revolving period are affected by age and other factors. Diaz-Hermelo et al. (2001) incorporated 
member responses into the decision model of a cotton ginning cooperative. The member’s 
production function was estimated from a survey data set. Then the member’s production was 
incorporated into the cooperative’s expected value of equity. The impacts and tradeoffs of 
alternative management strategies were simulated based on assumed parameters and weights. He 
concluded that decreasing cash patronage to increase stock redemption is a poor strategy.  
Royer and Smith  (2007) used adaptive expectation model on the estimation of patronage 
refunds expected by the member. The condition hold for equilibrium is that the marginal cost of 
production equal to the cash price offered by the coop plus the expected patronage refunds. They 
presented that maximizing coop profit yields the lowest production and highest product price 
while maximizing member profit yields the highest production and lowest product price.  
Briggeman and Jorgensen (2009)’s paper is the first paper focused on FCS associations’ 
patronage payments. They used survey data and a conjoint analysis to identify member’s 
preference between cash patronage refunds versus lower fixed real estate interest rates. Their 
results showed that the preference for cash patronage payments is so high that on average the 
members are willing to pay higher interest rates. Page 11 of 27 
 
Patronage refunds problem has been an important topic in the agricultural cooperative 
research. In the beginning only one side, either the cooperative or the producer member side was 
picked up and investigated. Given fixed value of a set of parameters the impacts of changing 
patronage refunds ratio and changing the revolving term were evaluated either on the 
cooperative’s capital structure or on the member’s profitability. Eventually the researches have 
been moved towards on how to incorporate the responses of the member producers into the 
capital management of the cooperatives. Models also captured the relation between the member 
and the cooperative in a dynamic and stochastic way. Except the Briggeman and Jorgensen 
paper, no economic research has been done directly on FCS institutions or even on  financial 
cooperatives. The Briggeman and Jorgensen paper used 174 observations on surveys data which 
is based on one FCS association. This may produce less general conclusion on the overall 
preference of patronage refunds. Therefore it is meaningful to conduct analysis with a rich 
dataset and thoroughly investigated the determinants of patronage refunds at the cooperatives 
side.  
 
4.  Time Trend and Regional Pattern 
Some FCS associations pay out patronage regularly, some pay it occasionally and many 
just never pay. From 2000 to 2009, among the total 1141 valid observations there are 723 
observations of paying patronage refunds. In other words, among the 305 associations 129 
associations never pay any patronage and 106 associations pay patronage refunds regularly. Even 
many associations don’t pay patronage refunds every year the dynamics chart in Figure1 clearly 
indicates the trend that more and more associations start to pay patronage refunds.  Page 12 of 27 
 
Figure1. Patronage refunds dynamics 2000-2009 
 
In March 2000 there were 195 associations and after years of mergers there were only 88 
left in 2009. Even the total number of association is decreasing the proportion of associations 
who pay cash patronage refunds is increasing. In Figure1, the percentage of payers equals to the 
number of associations who paid cash patronage refund over the total number of associations in 
that year. There were 40.44% associations paid patronage refunds in 2000 but 89.25% 
associations paid patronage refunds in 2007 which is the peak year. The columns indicate that 
the total amount of cash patronage refunds is also increasing over most years. It is observed that 
both percentage and total amount decrease slightly in 2008 and sharply in 2009 because of the 
financial crisis and commodity price increase.  
There are currently five regional banks (CoBank, AgFirst, AgriBank, FCB Texas, and US 
AgBank) serving the member associations in FCS. Although associations can get involved with 
other associations’ operation outside their own region via loan participation and loan 



































(Figure 2). Therefore regional consistency is expected for the associations’ patronage refund 
policies. 
Figure2. FCS Regional Banks (from Farm Credit Administration web) 
 
Figure3 gives the percentage of associations paid cash patronage refunds by regions. Data 
from 2003 are used because the current five districts were structured since then. All the five 
associations in the CoBank district have patronage refunds payment in each year. AgFirst 
associations are regular payers between 2003 and 2008. Only in 2009 two associations out of 21 
do not pay patronage refunds. There is obvious trend that more associations in AgriBank and US 
AgBank start to pay patronage refunds over the years. FCB Texas is the one with large deviation. 
In 2003 about half of their association has patronage refunds, as well as in 2009. But in 2007 all 
associations pay patronage refunds.  Page 14 of 27 
 
Figure3. Patronage refunds percentage by regions 2003-2009. 
  
To further analyze the regional patronage refunds pattern, Figure4 compare the ratio of 
real estate loans to total loans and the implied interest rate. The ratio of an association’s real 
estate loan over total loans is available since 2005 in the FCA reports. The higher that ratio, the 
less contact the association has with borrowers, and the less valuable a patronage policy 
becomes. Usually if the association have heavy reliance on real estate loans the borrower contact 
is less important. Besides paying patronage refunds, associations can also share profit with their 
members by lowering the interest rate on the loans. For example, Briggeman and Jorgensen 
(2009) analyze the preference between cash patronage refunds versus lower fixed real estate 
interest rates and find strong preference on patronage refunds. Therefore interest rate is a 
relevant factor that influences the patronage refunds policy. Actual interest rate is impossible to 
be traced in the lender’s accounting book so I use the ratio of total interest income from loans 
and leases over total accrual loans and leases to represent the interest charged by the 
















Figure4. Real estate loans ration and implied interest rate. 
 
CoBank has the lowest ratio of real estate loans which indicates the importance of bonding 
with borrowers and supports the observation of 100% of patronage refunds payers. AgFirst has 
the second lowest ratio of real estate loans and has 100% of patronage refunds payers in most 
years. FCB Texas and US AgBank have the highest real estate loans ratios and their patronage 
refunds behavior are quite similar except 2009. As for the interest rate, it is not meaningful to 
compare the absolute levels between regions since the term loans portfolio are different between 
regions. But it is meaningful to point out the different patronage refunds policy between 
AgriBank and AgFirst (the red and green lines in the figure4).  From the Real Estate ratio chart 
the AgriBank and AgFirst have similar real estate loan ratios but AgFirst obviously charge a 
higher interest rate than AgriBank. There is almost 1% interest gap. AgFirst pays significantly 
more patronage refunds than AgriBank. It shows that even the loans structures of the two regions 
are similar AgFirst choose to return the profit by paying patronage refunds while AgriBank 

























interest rate, there are other factors that are believed to influence patronage refunds decision. 
More explanation on the selection of variables and a logit model are introduced in the following 
sections. 
 
5.  Data Description and Model Specification 
The data used in this paper are the quarterly data downloaded from Farm Credit 
Administration web site.
3 Currently Call report
4 data between March 2000 and December 2009 
are available. In each quarter, there are about 20 different Schedules including Balance Sheet, 
Income Statement, Changes in Net Worth, Reconcilement of Net Worth, Performance of Loans, 
and etc. Insights to create an empirical patronage refunds model come from the literature of 
capital management of cooperatives and the literature of bank dividends policy. I propose that 
the decision of paying the patronage refund is affected by the following factors: size, 
profitability, capital adequacy, retained earnings, investment opportunity, risk, interest rate, tax, 
real estate loans share. After merging schedules and generating annual variables, I have 1187 
observations with approximately 300 associations over 10 years. The dataset is unbalanced 
because of the continuous mergers of associations and combination of regions.   
In the theory of corporate finance dividends tend to be paid by mature firms who have 
higher profitability but lower growth rate. It is referred as Life-cycle theory in dividends 
literature (Fama and French 2001, Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan 2002, DeAngelo, 






on Assets which equals Current Earnings/Assets. Grow is defined as the current Total 
Loans/Assets. Grow also represents the investment opportunity since loans composes the 
majority of the investment in FCS cooperatives.
5   
Asset is used as the Size variable to find out if large associations pay higher patronage 
refunds. Capital-adequacy (EA ratio) is measured as the ratio of equity capital over total assets. 
URE is defined as the unallocated retained earnings over the earning surplus. It measures the 
proportion of earnings that is retained as unallocated. As used in Figure4, Interest-Rate is defined 
as the total loans interest income divided by the total accrual loans. Real Estate ratio is defined 
as the real estate loans over total loans. Credit-Risk is defined as the proportion of nonaccrual 
loans, i.e. the amount of bad loans in the total loans. Tax is defined as taxes paid over income 
before income taxes and extraordinary items. In order to keep the factors within a comparable 
magnitude, ratios are multiplied by 100 to indicate a percentage change. Log Assets is used as 
Size.   
Means of the explanatory variables are summarized and compared between the 
associations who pay patronage and those who don’t in Table2. In order to keep the observations 
consistent and comparable with a balanced dataset, I choose data from 2005 to 2009 since the 
real estate ratio is only available from 2005. And I only include the associations who appear in 
all the five years which end up with 75 ACAs
6 and 375 observations.  
 
                                                            
5 In commercial banks, loans are normally as important as securities in the point of view of bank investment. But 
FCS cooperatives are established to provide agricultural loans to farmers, loans is absolutely the major investment.  
6 ACA: Agricultural Credit Association. An ACA can provide short, intermediate, and long term credit to borrowers. 
ACAs are the majority type of associations in FCS. The other type is FLCA, Federal Land Credit Association, which 
only make long term loans.  Page 18 of 27 
 
Table2. Means of the explanatory factor (all in percentage except Size) 
Year  N= 
66 
N= 
309  Real Estate Ratio Interest Rate Grow  Profit 
 Payer or not  N  Y  N  Y  N  Y  N  Y  N  Y 
2005 15 60 66.16 56.81 6.12 6.40 94.65 93.83  17.49 17.87
2006  12  63  62.02 56.23 7.14 7.39 93.60 92.58  19.78 16.60
2007 8  67  65.51 54.81 6.97 7.62 94.34 91.92  19.37 16.36
2008  10  65  60.96 52.99 5.90 6.31 93.80 91.77  17.90 15.95
2009 21 54 62.27 50.86 5.53 5.26 92.85 92.15  16.10 16.24
Year  EA ratio  URE  Size  Credit Risk  Tax 
  Payer  or  not  N Y N  Y  N Y N Y N Y 
2005  18.25  18.89  97.89 83.06 12.99 13.07 0.49 0.46  3.13 3.25
2006 20.94 17.34  99.10 83.76 12.65 13.27 0.55 0.38  3.43 1.37
2007  20.10  17.11  100.00 84.37 13.33 13.26 0.39 0.48  4.79 1.58
2008 18.41 16.65  100.00 83.33 12.95 13.42 0.88 1.01  3.06 1.11
2009  16.72  16.81  86.31 78.17 12.92 13.57 3.45 2.13  2.50 1.93
 
The associations who do not pay patronage refunds usually have higher percentage of 
real estate loans, charge lower interest rate, have more loans volume, are more profitable, have 
higher capital adequacy, keep significantly more earnings as unallocated, slightly smaller in size, 
and pay more tax. The Credit risk difference is not conclusive. The descriptive statistics are not 
contradictory to my anticipation in most cases. Whether or not the relations exist as expected and 
are significant need to be tested with statistical regression. 
Logistic model is selected since the dependent variable is dichotomic. 1 indicates the 
paying patronage refunds decision and 0 indicates the not paying decision. Unlike OLS 
regression, Logistic regression has less restrictions, such as: it does not assume the linear 
relationship between dependent and independent, does not require normality of variables, and Page 19 of 27 
 
does not assume homoscedasticity. But Logistic model requires that the observations are 
independent. When this assumption is violated the estimated standard errors are incorrect and 
may lead wrong inferences. Since my dataset do have repeated measure on the same subject over 
years and the observations of same subject over years are likely to be dependent, the method of 
generalized estimating equations (GEE) is used to account for the correlations among the 
observations of same subject.    
GEE first estimates the parameters with the assumption of independent observations and 
uses the residuals to estimate the correlations among observations of same subject.  Then the 
correlation is used to conduct the second round of estimation of the parameters. This process is 
repeated until the difference between two successive estimates are very small. In SAS PROC 
GENMOD with the REPEATED option is implemented to fit the data. 
 
6.  Preliminary Results 
Since the CoBank region only has five associations, the logistic model with GEE cannot 
generate positive definite Hessian matrix for a valid estimation with the region dummy variables. 
In order to evaluate the region diversity on paying patronage refunds, a regular logistic model is 
utilized. Then GEE is applied without region dummies. The first run includes all valid 1187 
observations with 10 different regions in 10 years.
7  The second run includes only the five 
current regions and 603 observations (2003-2009) are used. Table3 lists the significant 
parameters estimates. Complete statistics results are attached by the end of the paper. The model 
estimated with regular logistic regression is specified as: 
                                                            
7 Regions are merged and combined into five since 2003.  Page 20 of 27 
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Table3. Significant parameters of the regular logistic regression model with region dummies. 
Run 1  1174 Observations (2000-2009) Run 2  603 observations (2003-2009) 
Parameters  Estimate  Std Err  Pr>ChiSq  Parameters  Estimate  Std Err  Pr>ChiSq
Dist9  -0.9252  0.2721  0.0007            
Dist11  -2.4301  0.3995  <0.0001       
Dist17  -1.447  0.2919  <0.0001             
Dist18  -1.874  0.7627  0.014 Dist10  0.9093  0.4096  0.0264
Dist20  3.1925 0.5673  <0.0001  Dist20  2.5774 0.7406  0.0005
Dist22  -0.7333  0.2513  0.0035 Dist22  -0.666  0.2913  0.0222
Interest Rate  18.9509 4.2046  <0.0001  Interest Rate 25.6903 8.8258  0.0036
URE  -1.2652  0.5306  0.0171 URE  -4.034  1.3209  0.0023
Credit Risk  -32.1577 8.1617  <0.0001  Credit Risk  -41.2094 11.149  0.0002
Size  0.3453  0.0873  <0.0001  Size  0.4088  0.1191  0.0006
 
The two runs basically give consistent results with the same set and signs of significant 
parameters. Dist20 is AgFirst and Dist22 is AgriBank. The positive sign on Dist20 and negative 
sign on Dist22 indicate that associations in AgFrist region more likely decide to pay patronage 
refunds and associations in AgriBank less likely to pay. This support the regional pattern showed 
in Figure2. Among all the eight defined explanatory variables, Interest Rate, URE rate, Credit 
Risk and Size are significant. The associations with higher interest rate, lower percentage of 
earnings retained as unallocated, lower credit risk, and larger size have higher probability of 
choosing to pay patronage refunds.  Page 21 of 27 
 
From the goodness of fit criteria, Scaled Deviance and Pearson’s Chi-square statistics are 
very close to 1 which indicate no overdispersion or underdispersion. The Likelihood Ratio 
statistics in the Type 1 analysis gives information on testing the hypothesis of the significance of 
each additional explanatory variable and both of the two runs of model show that region dummy, 
interest rate, capital adequacy, credit risk and size are significant to the model fitness 
improvement.  
In order to adjust for the repeated measurement of same association over years, GEE is 
applied and the working correlation between the dependent observations is assumed to be 
autoregressive with AR(1). Region dummies have to be removed to get the algorithm converged. 
Also the real estate ratio is omitted from the regular logistic model since this variable is only 
available after 2005. Adding this explanatory variable reduces the dataset into 375 observations 
with 75 ACAs in 5 years. The model estimated with GEE is specified as the following 
ε β β β β β
β β β β α
+ + + + + +
+ + + + = =
Size risk Credit Tax URE EA
Grow profit rate Interest rate RE patronage
9 8 7 6 5
4 3 2 1
_                                 
_ _ ) 1 ln(
 
Table4 provides the parameters estimates. Among the nine explanatory variables, real 
estate rate, interest rate, unallocated retained earnings rate, and credit risk are significant. 
Therefore the model is fitted again with only the significant factors in Run4 and removing 
insignificant factors does not affect the model fitness because the goodness of fit statistics do not 
change. The GEE results also support the relationships showed in the regular logistic model in 
Run1 and Run2. In general, the associations with higher interest rate, lower real estate loans 
ratio, less unallocated retained earnings, and smaller credit risk are more likely to pay cash 
patronage refunds. Page 22 of 27 
 
Table4. Parameter estimates of GEE.  
Run3  375 observations   Deviance=0.7671   Pearson=0.823 
Parameters  Estimate  Std Err  95% Confidence Limits  Z  Pr > |Z| 
Intercept  2.4486 5.3559 -8.0487 12.9459 0.46 0.6475
RE_rate  -4.3702  1.6115 -7.5287 -1.2117  -2.71  0.0067
Profit  9.0082 25.497 -40.9651 58.9814 0.35 0.7239
Interest rate  28.7565  14.5697 0.2005 57.3126  1.97  0.0484
Grow  -1.8551 3.3268 -8.3755 4.6653  -0.56 0.5771
Ea  -1.6142  25.0817 -50.7734 47.545  -0.06  0.9487
URE -3.5524  1.336 -6.1709 -0.9339 -2.66  0.0078
Tax  0.0089  0.9684 -1.8891 1.9069  0.01  0.9927
Credit risk  -48.4507  17.0935 -81.9532 -14.9481 -2.83  0.0046
Size  0.3053  0.3093 -0.3009 0.9115  0.99  0.3237
Run4  375 observations   Deviance=0.7782   Pearson=0.839 
Parameters  Estimate  Std Err  95% Confidence Limits  Z  Pr > |Z| 
Intercept  6.1185 1.7611 2.6669 9.5702 3.47 0.0005
RE_rate  -4.3795  1.4142 -7.1513 -1.6077  -3.1  0.002
Interest rate  25.2269 13.4727 -1.179 51.6328  1.87  0.0611
URE  -3.4412  1.2677 -5.9259 -0.9565  -2.71  0.0066
Credit risk  -48.35 15.6927 -79.107 -17.593 -3.08  0.0021
 
) _ 35 . 48 44 . 3 _ 23 . 25 _ 38 . 4 12 . 6 exp( 1
) _ 35 . 48 44 . 3 _ 23 . 25 _ 38 . 4 12 . 6 exp(
) (
_ 35 . 48 44 . 3 _ 23 . 25 _ 38 . 4 12 . 6
) 1 ln(
risk Credit URE rate Interest rate RE
risk Credit URE rate Interest rate RE
paying prob
risk Credit URE rate Interest rate RE
patronage
− − + − +
− − + −
=
⇒
− − + − =
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In order to compare the influence of each significant factors, I assume a baseline scenario 
with real estate ratio 0.5, interest rate 0.05, URE 0.8 and credit risk 0.01. Table 5 gives the effect 
on the probability of paying patronage refunds with changing one factor at a time.  Page 23 of 27 
 
Table5. Demonstration of the probability change of paying patronage refunds 
coefficients Baseline Real  estate  ratio Interest rate  URE  Credit risk 
6.12                
-4.38  0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5
25.23  0.05  0.05 0.06 0.05  0.05
-3.44  0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8
-48.35  0.01  0.01 0.01 0.01  0.02
   Baseline  Real estate ratio Interest rate  URE  Credit risk 
  X β α +   1.956  1.518 2.2083 1.612  1.4725
exp( X β α + )  7.070986 4.563089883 9.10023284 5.012827  4.360122
Probability  0.876099  0.820243782 0.900992381 0.833689  0.813437
For example, if the real estate loans ratio increases from 0.5 to 0.6 and all other factors do 
not change, then the probability of paying patronage refunds drops from 0.876 to 0.82. 
Accordingly probability of paying increases from 0.876 to 0.9 with 1% increase of interest rate. 
On the other hand, the probability decreases from 0.876 to 0.834 when URE changes from 0.8 to 
0.9, and decreases from 0.876 to 0.813 when bad loans ratio increases 1%.  
 
7.  Main Conclusions 
Associations normally are reluctant to change the patronage refunds policy. Among the 
1187 observations in my dataset, I only find 50 observations of switching from not paying 
patronage refunds to paying, 59 observations of switching from paying to not paying. In all other 
observations the association keeps the same policy in current year as the previous year, no matter 
paying or not paying. But on average, there is clearly trend of more associations paying 
patronage refunds over time. Associations in different bank region do show different preference Page 24 of 27 
 
on patronage refunds policy. Some choose to return the profit to members by paying patronage 
refunds in cash and some choose to lower the loan interest rate.  
It is true that the patronage refunds policy is largely a decision made by the management 
team at very individual association level. Sometimes it can be triggered by quite specific reason, 
such as marketing tool, lump sum cash for member’s tax burden, or response to bank’s patronage 
policy change. In this paper, the good model fitness and consistent estimates over different 
model runs provide empirical evidence on the relationships between certain factors and the 
paying decision in general.   
Among the proposed relevant factors: size, profitability, loans volume, capital adequacy, 
bad loans, interest rate, and real estate loans share, four factors are significant: real estate loans 
share, interest rate, unallocated retained earnings share, and bad loans ratio. When the 
association faces the decision of patronage refunds, a high interest rate charged, a low real estate 
loans reliance, a low credit risk, and a lower unallocated earnings share usually affect the 
association to prefer a patronage refunds paying decision.  
This paper does not find evidence to support the life cycle theory of dividends policy in 
corporate finance. The profit level and growth of loans do not have significant effect on the 
decision of paying patronage refunds in FCS associations. Main reason is that FCS is a regulated 
cooperative system and the goal of operation is not maximizing the return of investor’s 
investment.  
Future analysis on how much patronage refund is decided among the payers will help 
understand the allocation and capital management of the equity in FCS associations. Enventually 
with more data observations, regional dummies should be added back to the GEE estimation in Page 25 of 27 
 
order to better illustrate the regional patterns on patronage refunds. Also the analysis of the term 
structure of revolving account is not approachable in statistical models because of the data 
limitation. A simulation model may be preferred in order to add the revolving account to the 
analysis of patronage refunds.  
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Criteria For Assessing Goodness Of Fit
Criterion DF Value Value/DF
Deviance 1156 1063.9396 0.9204
Scaled Deviance 1156 1063.9396 0.9204
Pearson Chi-Square 1156 993.0680 0.8591
Scaled Pearson X2 1156 993.0680 0.8591
Log Likelihood   -531.9698  
Algorithm converged.
Analysis Of Parameter Estimates
Parameter   DF Estimate Standard Error Wald 95% Confidence Limits Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept   1 -3.8298 2.5062 -8.7418 1.0822 2.34 0.1265
DIST 9 1 -0.9252 0.2721 -1.4585 -0.3918 11.56 0.0007
DIST 10 1 0.1185 0.2544 -0.3802 0.6171 0.22 0.6415
DIST 11 1 -2.4301 0.3995 -3.2131 -1.6470 36.99 <.0001
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DIST 17 1 -1.4470 0.2919 -2.0190 -0.8749 24.58 <.0001
DIST 18 1 -1.8740 0.7627 -3.3689 -0.3791 6.04 0.0140
DIST 20 1 3.1925 0.5673 2.0807 4.3044 31.67 <.0001
DIST 21 1 1.6821 1.0727 -0.4204 3.7846 2.46 0.1169
DIST 22 1 -0.7333 0.2513 -1.2259 -0.2408 8.51 0.0035
DIST 23 1 23.4144 30189.98 -59147.9 59194.69 0.00 0.9994
DIST 24 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . .
profit   1 9.0760 5.8225 -2.3358 20.4878 2.43 0.1190
interest   1 18.9509 4.2046 10.7101 27.1917 20.31 <.0001
grow   1 -1.0031 2.2311 -5.3760 3.3698 0.20 0.6530
ea   1 -0.7953 5.6417 -11.8529 10.2623 0.02 0.8879
URE   1 -1.2652 0.5306 -2.3053 -0.2252 5.68 0.0171
tax   1 -0.2466 0.3846 -1.0004 0.5073 0.41 0.5215
credit   1 -32.1577 8.1617 -48.1543 -16.1610 15.52 <.0001
size   1 0.3453 0.0873 0.1742 0.5164 15.65 <.0001
Scale   0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000    
NOTE: The scale parameter was held fixed.
LR Statistics For Type 1 Analysis
Source Deviance DF Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept 1534.6397      
DIST 1129.7147 9 404.93 <.0001
profit 1126.5691 1 3.15 0.0761
interest 1107.0238 1 19.55 <.0001
grow 1107.0229 1 0.00 0.9757
ea 1102.9589 1 4.06 0.0438
URE 1098.5138 1 4.45 0.0350
tax 1096.5318 1 1.98 0.1592
credit 1080.1412 1 16.39 <.0001
size 1063.9396 1 16.20 <.0001
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Criteria For Assessing Goodness Of Fit
Criterion DF Value Value/DF
Deviance 590 476.1518 0.8070
Scaled Deviance 590 476.1518 0.8070
Pearson Chi-Square 590 444.6927 0.7537
Scaled Pearson X2 590 444.6927 0.7537
Log Likelihood   -238.0759  
Algorithm converged.
Analysis Of Parameter Estimates
Parameter   DF Estimate Standard Error Wald 95% Confidence Limits Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept   1 -0.6561 3.9835 -8.4635 7.1514 0.03 0.8692
new_dist 10 1 0.9093 0.4096 0.1065 1.7120 4.93 0.0264
new_dist 20 1 2.5774 0.7406 1.1258 4.0291 12.11 0.0005
new_dist 22 1 -0.6660 0.2913 -1.2370 -0.0951 5.23 0.0222
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new_dist 23 1 24.2554 53209.37 -104264 104312.7 0.00 0.9996
new_dist 24 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . .
profit   1 -8.4507 10.6783 -29.3799 12.4784 0.63 0.4287
interest   1 25.6903 8.8258 8.3920 42.9886 8.47 0.0036
grow   1 -3.5874 3.6582 -10.7573 3.5825 0.96 0.3268
ea   1 19.8531 10.7230 -1.1636 40.8698 3.43 0.0641
URE   1 -4.0340 1.3209 -6.6229 -1.4452 9.33 0.0023
tax   1 0.1560 0.4449 -0.7159 1.0280 0.12 0.7258
credit   1 -41.2094 11.1490 -63.0612 -19.3577 13.66 0.0002
size   1 0.4088 0.1191 0.1753 0.6423 11.77 0.0006
Scale   0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000    
NOTE: The scale parameter was held fixed.
LR Statistics For Type 1 Analysis
Source Deviance DF Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept 638.8257      
new_dist 532.5285 4 106.30 <.0001
profit 532.1116 1 0.42 0.5185
interest 516.8807 1 15.23 <.0001
grow 515.4942 1 1.39 0.2390
ea 515.3370 1 0.16 0.6918
URE 504.8323 1 10.50 0.0012
tax 504.8290 1 0.00 0.9541
credit 488.6934 1 16.14 <.0001
size 476.1518 1 12.54 0.0004
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Criteria For Assessing Goodness Of Fit
Criterion DF Value Value/DF




   
  
Deviance 365 279.9977 0.7671
Scaled Deviance 365 279.9977 0.7671
Pearson Chi-Square 365 300.3867 0.8230
Scaled Pearson X2 365 300.3867 0.8230
Log Likelihood   -139.9988  
Algorithm converged.
Analysis Of Initial Parameter Estimates
Parameter DF Estimate Standard Error Wald 95% Confidence Limits Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept 1 -0.3805 4.5959 -9.3883 8.6274 0.01 0.9340
RE_rate 1 -4.4239 1.1838 -6.7442 -2.1036 13.96 0.0002
profit 1 20.6438 16.3404 -11.3829 52.6704 1.60 0.2065
interest 1 50.3156 18.3267 14.3960 86.2351 7.54 0.0060
grow 1 2.4040 3.9515 -5.3408 10.1489 0.37 0.5429
ea 1 -13.4315 16.1882 -45.1598 18.2969 0.69 0.4067
URE 1 -5.7141 1.5220 -8.6971 -2.7311 14.10 0.0002
tax 1 -1.0977 1.8725 -4.7678 2.5724 0.34 0.5577
credit 1 -36.5009 12.4879 -60.9769 -12.0250 8.54 0.0035
size 1 0.2692 0.1480 -0.0208 0.5592 3.31 0.0689
Scale 0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000    
NOTE: The scale parameter was held fixed.
GEE Model Information
Correlation Structure AR(1)
Subject Effect UNINUM (75 levels)
Number of Clusters 75
Correlation Matrix Dimension 5
Maximum Cluster Size 5
Minimum Cluster Size 5
Covariance Matrix (Model-Based)
  Prm1 Prm2 Prm3 Prm4 Prm5 Prm6 Prm7 Prm8 Prm9 Prm10
Prm1 31.15104 -0.01071 14.08932 -36.80868 -17.80222 -22.96910 -0.19091 -0.32989 -26.41830 -0.76230
Prm2 -0.01071 2.73334 -9.98052 -3.89541 -1.90516 7.86292 0.13848 0.14369 1.53716 0.03822
Prm3 14.08932 -9.98052 596.45 25.61652 11.35093 -578.75 -2.73443 2.54503 -13.45547 -1.26059






Prm4 -36.80868 -3.89541 25.61652 263.59 10.46192 -17.19585 1.05854 0.16926 64.30005 0.80358
Prm5 -17.80222 -1.90516 11.35093 10.46192 20.99932 -9.56241 -1.56860 -0.06501 10.85241 -0.02096
Prm6 -22.96910 7.86292 -578.75 -17.19585 -9.56241 595.14 -0.23984 -2.15960 8.88119 1.61722
Prm7 -0.19091 0.13848 -2.73443 1.05854 -1.56860 -0.23984 2.24108 -0.18041 8.21694 -0.008030
Prm8 -0.32989 0.14369 2.54503 0.16926 -0.06501 -2.15960 -0.18041 2.01692 -1.00979 0.02773
Prm9 -26.41830 1.53716 -13.45547 64.30005 10.85241 8.88119 8.21694 -1.00979 153.55 0.19462
Prm10 -0.76230 0.03822 -1.26059 0.80358 -0.02096 1.61722 -0.008030 0.02773 0.19462 0.04898
Covariance Matrix (Empirical)
  Prm1 Prm2 Prm3 Prm4 Prm5 Prm6 Prm7 Prm8 Prm9 Prm10
Prm1 28.68529 -1.01626 45.39661 -30.91287 -5.31314 -56.53267 -1.96937 0.60114 -42.87292 -1.28300
Prm2 -1.01626 2.59699 -12.16064 -3.35000 -1.44945 7.78562 0.33894 0.04985 1.36849 0.10506
Prm3 45.39661 -12.16064 650.10 40.16566 5.57069 -622.95 -3.81041 -1.57732 -1.00632 -3.30401
Prm4 -30.91287 -3.35000 40.16566 212.28 -2.16013 -14.66539 1.63575 -0.94847 79.00276 1.15085
Prm5 -5.31314 -1.44945 5.57069 -2.16013 11.06754 -2.80777 -1.16334 -0.84856 16.01899 -0.28112
Prm6 -56.53267 7.78562 -622.95 -14.66539 -2.80777 629.09 2.97305 1.71945 22.03333 3.64979
Prm7 -1.96937 0.33894 -3.81041 1.63575 -1.16334 2.97305 1.78489 -0.28989 9.44958 0.09436
Prm8 0.60114 0.04985 -1.57732 -0.94847 -0.84856 1.71945 -0.28989 0.93778 -7.58377 0.04216
Prm9 -42.87292 1.36849 -1.00632 79.00276 16.01899 22.03333 9.44958 -7.58377 292.19 0.46909
Prm10 -1.28300 0.10506 -3.30401 1.15085 -0.28112 3.64979 0.09436 0.04216 0.46909 0.09567
Algorithm converged.
Working Correlation Matrix
  Col1 Col2 Col3 Col4 Col5
Row1 1.0000 0.6109 0.3732 0.2280 0.1392
Row2 0.6109 1.0000 0.6109 0.3732 0.2280
Row3 0.3732 0.6109 1.0000 0.6109 0.3732
Row4 0.2280 0.3732 0.6109 1.0000 0.6109
Row5 0.1392 0.2280 0.3732 0.6109 1.0000
Analysis Of GEE Parameter Estimates
Empirical Standard Error Estimates
Parameter Estimate Standard Error 95% Confidence Limits Z Pr > |Z|
Intercept 2.4486 5.3559 -8.0487 12.9459 0.46 0.6475
RE_rate -4.3702 1.6115 -7.5287 -1.2117 -2.71 0.0067
profit 9.0082 25.4970 -40.9651 58.9814 0.35 0.7239




interest 28.7565 14.5697 0.2005 57.3126 1.97 0.0484
grow -1.8551 3.3268 -8.3755 4.6653 -0.56 0.5771
ea -1.6142 25.0817 -50.7734 47.5450 -0.06 0.9487
URE -3.5524 1.3360 -6.1709 -0.9339 -2.66 0.0078
tax 0.0089 0.9684 -1.8891 1.9069 0.01 0.9927
credit -48.4507 17.0935 -81.9532 -14.9481 -2.83 0.0046
size 0.3053 0.3093 -0.3009 0.9115 0.99 0.3237
Score Statistics For Type 3 GEE Analysis
Source DF Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
RE_rate 1 5.31 0.0212
profit 1 0.08 0.7841
interest 1 3.11 0.0780
grow 1 0.36 0.5472
ea 1 0.00 0.9573
URE 1 6.56 0.0105
tax 1 0.00 0.9931
credit 1 7.58 0.0059
size 1 1.18 0.2769
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Criteria For Assessing Goodness Of Fit
Criterion DF Value Value/DF
Deviance 370 287.9186 0.7782
Scaled Deviance 370 287.9186 0.7782
Pearson Chi-Square 370 310.4448 0.8390
Scaled Pearson X2 370 310.4448 0.8390
Log Likelihood   -143.9593  









Analysis Of Initial Parameter Estimates
Parameter DF Estimate Standard Error Wald 95% Confidence Limits Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept 1 6.6043 1.8026 3.0712 10.1374 13.42 0.0002
RE_rate 1 -3.6930 1.0596 -5.7698 -1.6162 12.15 0.0005
interest 1 33.7738 16.8718 0.7056 66.8420 4.01 0.0453
URE 1 -5.0286 1.3155 -7.6069 -2.4503 14.61 0.0001
credit 1 -43.5034 11.9748 -66.9737 -20.0332 13.20 0.0003
Scale 0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000    
NOTE: The scale parameter was held fixed.
GEE Model Information
Correlation Structure AR(1)
Subject Effect UNINUM (75 levels)
Number of Clusters 75
Correlation Matrix Dimension 5
Maximum Cluster Size 5
Minimum Cluster Size 5
Covariance Matrix (Model-Based)
  Prm1 Prm2 Prm3 Prm4 Prm5
Prm1 3.50798 -1.00062 -16.21762 -1.82241 -14.35914
Prm2 -1.00062 2.19542 -3.52611 -0.19577 1.75772
Prm3 -16.21762 -3.52611 258.61 2.25986 58.68891
Prm4 -1.82241 -0.19577 2.25986 1.85404 8.36974
Prm5 -14.35914 1.75772 58.68891 8.36974 143.66
Covariance Matrix (Empirical)
  Prm1 Prm2 Prm3 Prm4 Prm5
Prm1 3.10141 -1.08087 -12.99555 -1.48402 -19.29813
Prm2 -1.08087 2.00000 -1.26458 -0.16072 3.68712
Prm3 -12.99555 -1.26458 181.51 1.23881 70.98200
Prm4 -1.48402 -0.16072 1.23881 1.60717 10.20933
Prm5 -19.29813 3.68712 70.98200 10.20933 246.26







  Col1 Col2 Col3 Col4 Col5
Row1 1.0000 0.5624 0.3163 0.1779 0.1001
Row2 0.5624 1.0000 0.5624 0.3163 0.1779
Row3 0.3163 0.5624 1.0000 0.5624 0.3163
Row4 0.1779 0.3163 0.5624 1.0000 0.5624
Row5 0.1001 0.1779 0.3163 0.5624 1.0000
Analysis Of GEE Parameter Estimates
Empirical Standard Error Estimates
Parameter Estimate Standard Error 95% Confidence Limits Z Pr > |Z|
Intercept 6.1185 1.7611 2.6669 9.5702 3.47 0.0005
RE_rate -4.3795 1.4142 -7.1513 -1.6077 -3.10 0.0020
interest 25.2269 13.4727 -1.1790 51.6328 1.87 0.0611
URE -3.4412 1.2677 -5.9259 -0.9565 -2.71 0.0066
credit -48.3500 15.6927 -79.1070 -17.5930 -3.08 0.0021
Score Statistics For Type 3 GEE Analysis
Source DF Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
RE_rate 1 6.46 0.0110
interest 1 2.94 0.0862
URE 1 6.50 0.0108
credit 1 6.90 0.0086
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